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The brewing tug-of war between South Africa’s Chapter 9 Institutions: 
The Public Protector vs the Independent Electoral 
Commission 
 
Nomthandazo Ntlama* 
Abstract: The release of the Public Protector’s final report on the allegations of 
maladministration against the chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission has put 
under the microscope the development of the principles of the rule of law within the context 
of the powers and functions of these institutions in furthering the objectives of the new 
constitutional dispensation. It generated debates on whether these institutions are fulfilling 
their duty of promoting constitutional democracy or are at each other’s throats. These 
debates rests on the interrelationship that exist between the principle of accountability and 
the legitimate role that is played by the institutions themselves in ensuring the proper and 
effective strengthening of South Africa’s democracy. The debates also focus on the 
government’s commitment to the advancement of the rule of  law in the regulation of state 
authority.………………………………… 
Against this background, this paper examines the application of the principle of the rule of 
law within the framework of Chapter 9 institutions with particular reference to the Public 
Protector and the Independent Electoral Commission. Such undertaking is motivated by the 
recent release of the report as indicated above which reinforced the objective of having 
established the ‘anti-corruption and ethical institutions in bringing about good governance’ 
who subsequently became embroiled in a “cat-fight” over the legitimacy of their powers. 
The intention is not to analyse the constitutional status or history of these institutions but 
rather on the factors that have the potential to compromise their integrity and legitimacy in 
upholding the principles of the rule of law as foundational values of the new dispensation. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 19961 has since the attainment of democracy provided 
an important feature of the new dispensation by establishing Chapter 9 institutions2 in order to ensure the 
advancement of South Africa’s democratic character in the regulation of state authority. These institutions 
are empowered to be independent and expected to be impartial in the exercise of their functions in order 
to provide an effective oversight role of both public and private spheres in the regulation of their 
authorities. The Constitution has further provided an opportunity for ordinary citizens to get redress 
against maladministration in the exercise of government authority especially in a country like ours that 
emerges from a system that was characterised by oppression of its general populace and lacked 
accountability in the enforcement of both the state and government conduct3.  
                                               
 B. Juris, LLB (University of Fort Hare), Certificate in Comparative Human Rights, LLM (University of 
Stellenbosch), LLD (University of South Africa). 
1 Hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”. 
2 This does not necessarily mean that they are 9 (nine) but six and are included in Chapter 9 of the Constitution and 
hereinafter referred to as “institutions strengthening constitutional democracy in the Republic”. 
3 See the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (2007): Report of the ad hoc Committee on the Review of 
Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions. A report to the National Assembly of the Parliament of South Africa, Cape 
Town, South Africa at 3. See also Azanian Peoples Organization v President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (8) 
BCLR 1015 (CC). Mahomed DP pointed out that: “For decades South African history has been dominated by a deep 
conflict between a minority which reserved for itself all control over the political instruments of the state and a 
majority who sought to resist that domination … The legitimacy of law itself was deeply wounded as the country 
haemorrhaged dangerously in the face of this tragic conflict which had begun to traumatise the entire nation,” at para 
1. 
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The Constitutional Court further laid the foundation on the importance of these institutions in the 
Certification4 judgment as it held that ‘they have to ensure that government exercises its duties effectively 
and members of the public who are aggrieved by the government conduct should be able to lodge their 
complaints with them’.5 Sithebe also gives effect to the legitimacy of these institutions by pointing out 
that they ‘form the cornerstone to the sustenance of democracy and are important for the full realisation of 
other democratic principles such as accountability, respect for the rule of law and human rights’.6 In a 
nutshell, these institutions were established and designed to: 
 restore the credibility of the state and its institutions in the eyes of the majority of its 
citizens; 
 ensure that democracy and the values associated with human rights and democracy 
flourished in the new dispensation;  
 ensure the successful re-establishment of, and continued respect for, the rule of law; and 
 ensure that the state became more open and responsive to the needs of its citizens and 
more respectful of their rights.7  
These factors are essential as they provide guidance and shape the framework on how these 
institutions should execute their role in ‘assisting the various organs of state in adhering to their 
fundamental roles’.8 They are of fundamental importance in determining the advancement of the principle 
of rule of law which prohibits the arbitrary exercise of public power.9 They are also of direct relevance in 
respect of the way in which the Chapter 9 institutions themselves enforce the rule of law in the carrying 
out of their mandates in their own context. 
Against this background, this paper examines the application of the principle of the rule of law 
within the framework of Chapter 9 institutions with particular reference to the Public Protector10 and the 
Independent Electoral Commission.11 Such undertaking is motivated by the recent release of the Public 
Protector’s report12 on the allegations of maladministration against the chairperson of the Independent 
Electoral Commission whilst she was still the Chief Electoral Officer of the latter. It is further reinforced 
by the objective of having established the envisaged ‘anti-corruption and ethical institutions in bringing 
about good governance’13 who subsequently became embroiled in a “cat-fight” struggle over the 
legitimacy of their powers. The intention is not to analyse the constitutional status or history of these 
institutions14 but to focus on the factors that have the potential to compromise their integrity and 
legitimacy in upholding the principles of the rule of law as foundational values of the new dispensation.15 
It is argued that the institutions should not adopt an “arm’s length” approach to the evolution of the 
                                               
4Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC). 
5 Ibid, at para 161. 
6 See Sithebe K ‘Chapter 9 institutions: for the sake of accountability and constitutional democracy’ 24 March 2014 
accessed at www.africlaw.com on 05 May 2014. 
7 See the Report (note 3 above) at 3. 
8 See the De Vos P and Freedom W (eds) South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) Oxford Publishers, 
ISBN 978 019 5991376 at 258. 
9 See Kruger R ‘The South African Constitutional Court and the rule of law: the Masethla judgment, a cause for 
concern’ (2010) Volume 13 No 3 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal at 468-508. 
10 Established in terms of section 181(1)(a) of the Constitution, and hereinafter referred to as the “PP” and became 
operational effectively as from 01 October 1995. See also the historic development of the office of the Ombudsman 
(Public Protector) in Ntlama N ‘An overview of the ‘independence’ of the Ombudsman in South Africa and Namibia’ 
forthcoming in (2014) Volume 3, Stellenbosch Law Review Journal. 
11 Established in terms of section 181(1)(f) of the Constitution, hereinafter referred to as the “IEC”. The Commission 
came into being on 01 July 1997 when the first Commissioners were appointed and the Chief Electoral Officer in 
November 1997. 
12 See the report entitled: “Inappropriate Moves”: an investigation into allegations of maladministration and 
corruption in the procurement of the Riverside Office Park to accommodate the head offices of the Electoral 
Commission: No 13 of 2013/2014 ISBN 978-1-920692-0205. 
13 Extracted from Mukoro A ‘The Ombudsman phenomenon in African states public services’ Department of Local 
Government Studies, Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria at 4. 
14 See the general history in Ntlama N ‘An overview of the principle of ‘independence’ of the Ombudsman in South 
Africa and Namibia’ forthcoming (2014) Volume 3 Stellenbosch Law Review Journal, which has a direct relevance 
and application in respect of the two institutions under discussion herein. 
15 See section 1(c) of the 1996 Constitution which provides that the Republic of South Africa is founded on values of 
supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. 
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principles of the new democratic dispensation in legitimising their own constitutional and legal processes 
if they have to ensure the promotion of their integrity.  
2. Brief Overview of the Rule of Law 
The rule of law is one of the basic principles which constitute the new constitutional order as it influences 
the manner in which the organs of state16 are to execute their duties within the framework of the new 
dispensation17.  It is not just an ordinary principle but a foundational value of the new dispensation which 
require the application of public power within the framework of the law18.  It emerged to limit the powers 
of the rulers by subordinating their activities to the framework of the law in ensuring the transformation 
of the state to a constitutional state19.  It is deeply rooted in eliminating South Africa’s historic past where 
the state became the law unto itself and disregarded the proper and effective application of the law.20  
Without a focus on this history, the rule of law is designed as the ‘bedrock on which democracy and 
democratic practices are anchored’ in ensuring the maintenance of respect of the values and principles of 
the new dispensation21.  This was emphasised by Langa J in S v Makwanyane22  as he held that ‘when the 
Constitution was enacted it signalled a dramatic change in the system of governance from one based on 
rule by parliament to a constitutional state … where rule by force would be replaced by democratic 
principles and a governmental system based on the precepts of equality and freedom’.23 
The idea of the concept of the rule of law is therefore, traced back to Dicey24 who contended that it 
entails the functioning of the state within the framework of the law. This principle was articulated by the 
Constitutional Court in Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council.25 The Court held that the principle is the ‘conception of the new constitutional order that 
constrains the exercise of public power’.26 Subsequently, Chaskalson P in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa27 
shared the same sentiments as he also held that:  
“It is a requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of public power by the executive 
and other functionaries should not be arbitrary. Decisions must be rationally related to 
the purpose for which the power was given, otherwise they are in effect arbitrary and 
inconsistent with this requirement. It follows that in order to pass constitutional scrutiny 
the exercise of public power by the executive and other functionaries must, at least, 
comply with this requirement. If it does not, it falls short of the standards demanded by 
our Constitution for such action.”28  
                                               
16 See the definition of the organ of state in section 239 as: 
(a) any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of government or 
(b) any other functionary or institution 
(i) exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution; or 
exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation, but does not include a court or 
judicial officer. 
17 See Currie I and De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed (2005) Juta Publishers at 7. 
18 See Kruger (note 9 above) at 476. See also Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng entitled: ‘The rule of law in South 
Africa: measuring judicial performance and meeting standards’ 25 June 2013 accessed at 
www.constitutionallyspeaking.co.za on 25 May 2014. 
19 Diescho J ‘The paradigm of an independent judiciary: its history, implications and limitations in Africa’ at 22 in 
Horn N & Bosl A The independence of the judiciary in Namibia (2009) Macmillan Publishers, ISBN 978-99916-0-
807-5, Windhoek. 
20 Masethla v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (1) BCLR 1 (CC).at para 33. See also Abioye F ‘The 
rule of law in English speaking African countries: the case of Nigeria and South Africa’ Unpublished LLD thesis 
(2011) University of Pretoria. 
21 See Shivute P ‘The rule of law in Sub-Saharan Africa: an overview’ at 215 in Horn N & Bosi A (eds) Human 
rights and the rule of law in Namibia (2009) Macmillan Education Publishers, Namibia, ISBN: 978-99916-0-807-5. 
22 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
23 Makwanyane at para 220. 
24 Dicey AV Introduction to the study of law of the Constitution 10th ed (1959) quoted in Currie and De Waal (note 
17) above at 10. 
25 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC). 
26 Ibid at para 58. 
27 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC). 
28 Ibid at para 85. 
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It is drawn from above as Rautenbach & Malherbe point out that the principle of the rule of law 
encapsulates the following features: 
 accountability of government officials under the law. 
 legitimacy of the government conduct. 
 certainty of laws which are clearly defined and publicised. 
 application of the law in a fair, reasonable and accessible way.29 
 
Broadly, these features entail the significance of the rule of law within the domain of the public 
law function in the regulation of state and government authority. They are directly linked to the principle 
of accountability which is essential for the proper functioning of both the state and its Chapter 9 
institutions. Accountability is one of the foundational values for good governance in the prevention of 
abuse of state power which may undermine the promotion of the basic principles of the new constitutional 
dispensation. It subjects those holding public office to scrutiny in respect of the manner in which they 
exercise and perform their functions. The principle of accountability is interdependent to the concept of 
“Batho Pele” which means “People First”. The concept encapsulates the following principles: 
consultation, setting service standards, increasing access, ensuring courtesy, providing information, 
openness and transformation, redress and value for money. These principles seek to ensure: 
 The promotion and maintenance of high standards of professionalism in [good 
governance and leadership]. 
 The provision of service impartially, fairly, equitable and without bias. 
 The utilisation of resources efficiently and effectively. 
 The encouragement of citizens to policy making, and 
 The accountable, transparent and development-oriented public administration.30 
 
These factors give effect to the foundational provision of the Constitution as it entrenches the 
responsibility of the state in ensuring its accountability and transparency in the regulation of its 
authority.31 They further reinforce the application of section 41 and section 195 of the Constitution which 
spells out in no uncertain terms that accountability is essential for the upholding of the goals of South 
Africa’s democracy. Without focusing on the principles laid down in these sections, the significance of 
accountability in the regulation of state authority was endorsed by O’Regan J in Rail Commuters Action 
Group v Transnet Ltd/ t/a Metrorail32 as she held that: 
 Accountability of those exercising public power is one of the founding values of our 
Constitution [and] … is thus expressly mentioned in a range of provisions …is asserted within 
the scheme of the Bill of Rights [and] one which is relevant to a consideration of the “spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”.33  
 The value of accountability is asserted not only for the state, but also for all organs of state and 
public enterprises [and a] principle that government, and organs of state, are accountable for 
their conduct is an important principle that bears on the construction of constitutional and 
statutory obligations.34 
 
The importance of accountability and its interrelationship with the Batho Pele (“People First”) 
principles is a vanguard in the promotion of the advancement of the rule of law on monitoring 
                                               
29 See Rautenbach & Malherbe Constitutional law (2012) 6th ed LexisNexis Publishers, Cape Town, ISBN 
978409058390 at 9. 
30 Accessed at the Republic of South Africa Department of Independent Police Investigative Directorate website: 
www.ipd.gov.za on 29 July 2014. 
31 See section 1(d) of the Constitution. 
32 2005 (4) BCLR 301 (CC). 
33 See paras 74-75. 
34 See para 76. 
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government action and determining ways in which the rationality of its action can be examined.35 At the 
heart of such monitoring function, these principles have put into test the measures and mechanisms put in 
place by the Chapter 9 institutions in order to give expression to the rule of law. Without a focus on this 
role as well, it is clear that since the twenty year’s into the democracy, the focus has been on how 
government regulates its affairs but not on how the institutions themselves are actually giving effect to the 
upholding of the rule of law and accountability against maladministration within their own domain. It is 
actually unprecedented for a constitutional institution to investigate another and causes an uncertainty on 
the management of the relations in developing the principles on “watching the watchdog”.36 It also raises 
the question on the political commitment of the state to ensure the promotion and protection of the 
integrity of the constitutional institutions who are embroiled in a public spat over the findings of 
misconduct against each other. 
 
3. Watching the Watchdog: the tug of war between the Public Protector and the       
Independent Electoral Commission 
 
‘[the dawn of democracy] includes a promise of representative and accountable 
government functioning within the framework of pockets of [law] that are provided by 
various independent institutions, which include the office of the Public Protector … 
[where] the [fulfilment] of their demands will call for courage at times, but it will always 
call for vigilance and conviction of purpose’.37 
As indicated above, the Constitution establishes the following Chapter 9 institutions in order to strengthen 
constitutional democracy. These institutions include: 
(a) The Public Protector which is established in terms of section 181(a) and empowered to 
investigate any suspicion of improper conduct and report such conduct in order to take 
remedial action.38 
(b) The Human Rights Commission which is established in terms of section 181(b) to 
promote respect and the culture of human rights as envisaged in section 184 of the 
Constitution.39 
(c) The Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious 
and Linguistic Communities which is established in terms of section 181(c) to promote 
respect of the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities on the basis of 
equality and non-discrimination as entrenched in section 185 of the Constitution.40 
(d) The Commission for Gender Equality which is established in terms of section 181(d) to 
ensure the promotion of gender equality as contemplated in section 187 of the 
Constitution.41 
(e) The Auditor-General which is established in terms of section 181(e) to audit and report 
on the proper implementation of the government budget as envisaged in section 188 of 
the Constitution.42 
                                               
35 See for example Glenister v President of the South Africa 2011 (7) BCLR 651 (CC) where the Court dealt with the 
challenge on the disbandment of the Scorpions (Directorate of Special Operations). 
36 Extracted from Vawda Y and Mtshali M ‘Who is watching the watchers?: a critical assessment of the Independent 
Police Investigative Directorate’s prospects of investigating misconduct in the South African Police Service’ (2013) 
Volume 17 Law, Development & Democracy 132-156. 
37 See Nugent J in Mail & Guardian v The Public Protector 2011 (4) 420 SCA at para 8. 
38 See section 182 of the Constitution which is substantiated by the provisions of the Public Protector Act 23 of 1994 
as amended by Act 22 of 2003. 
39 The powers of the Commission are substantiated in the Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994 as amended by 
Act 47 of 1997. 
40 This is reinforced by the adoption of the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, 
Religious and Linguistic Communities Act 19 of 2002. 
41 This is also regulated in the Commission on Gender Equality Act 39 of 1996.  
42 This is further endorsed in the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004. 
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(f) The Electoral Commission which is established in terms of section 181(f) and 
empowered to manage elections in terms of section 90 as entrenched in section 90 of 
the Constitution.43 
 
The role of these institutions is to ‘monitor government conduct and contribute to the 
transformation of South Africa into a society in which social justice prevails’.44 Of great significance is 
their autonomous status from both the executive and the legislature in the execution of their duties45 even 
though they are accountable to Parliament.46 They are also meant to be independent which require other 
state organs not to interfere with their functioning and should be assisted in performing their functions.47 
Of great concern is the tension that has emanated from two of these institutions: the Public 
Protector and the Electoral Commission. These institutions have for the first time, in the history of South 
Africa’s democracy, brought the tug of war between them. The war emanates from the investigation by 
the Public Protector on allegations of irregularities in the procurement of the IEC’s head offices which 
were lodged by President of the United Democratic Movement and Member of Parliament: General Bantu 
Holomisa.48 The Public Protector had to investigate the ‘allegations of suspected irregularities in the 
procurement of the Riverside Office Park to accommodate the head offices of the Electoral Commission 
(the Commission), the validity of the lease agreements entered into by the Commission in respect thereof 
and various payments to Abland’. Also, to investigate further the conflict of interest between Adv. 
Tlakula and Member of Parliament: Honourable Thaba Mufamadi.49  
Without providing an extensive background on the allegations, after a thorough investigation into 
the matter, the Public Protector found that “the process of acquiring the head offices was grossly irregular 
and Advocate Tlakula, by her own admission, violated her own procurement policies.50 It was further 
found that she had an "undisclosed and unmanaged conflict of interest" in the lease, through her business 
relationship with Honourable Thaba Mufamadi, chairman of a company with a 20% stake in the company 
which was awarded the tender.51  
The findings were consolidated and substantiated by the Department of National Treasury which 
appointed an independent company: Price Waterhouse Coopers to conduct a forensic investigation on the 
matter.52 Treasury also found that Adv. Tlakula did not follow the due process in the tendering and 
awarding of the contract to the bidder. The misconduct of Adv. Tlakula was further affirmed by the 
Electoral Court in the United Democratic Movement v Tlakula judgment53 as the Court called for her 
removal from office as it also established that: 
 Adv Tlakula wilfully flaunted legal prescripts on a wholly insufficient basis … and failed to 
explain how a period of two years which were to elapse before any further elections were to be 
held, could possibly have rendered the circumstances or her decision of such an urgent nature to 
depart from the prescripts.54 
 She chose not to abide by the law ... Her actions in this regard are unlawful and as such, in our 
view, constitute misconduct ... Save for the urgency issue, which is untenable, the respondent 
provides no justification for her deliberate decision to break the law ... and concluded by [saying] 
that her failure to follow due process was due to an honest mistake.55 
                                               
43 The powers are further endorsed in the Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996 as amended by Act 14 of 2004. 
44 See Murray C ‘The Human Rights Commission et al: what is the role of South Africa’s Chapter 9 institutions?’ 
(2006) Volume 9 No 2 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal at 125 quoted in De Vos P and Freedom W (eds) South 
African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) Oxford University Press, ISBN: 9780195991376. 
45 See section 181(2) of the Constitution. 
46 See section 181(5) of the Constitution. 
47 See Marumoagae C ‘Condemning the leaking of Public Protector’s provisional reports’ (2014) De Rebus Journal, 
at 32. 
48 See the Report at para 2.1 at 23. 
49 Ibid, at 4. 
50 See the Report at paras 10.2.1 and 10.2.2. 
51 Ibid. 
52 See the report entitled: National Treasury Forensic Investigation: Electoral Commission Riverside Office Park, 14 
December 2013. 
53 (EC 05/15) [2014] ZAEC 5 (18 June 2014). 
54 Ibid at para 95. 
55 Ibid, at paras 99 and 102. 
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Against this background, of great concern is the response of Adv. Tlakula to these findings. First, 
the manner in which she conducted herself during the investigation further leaves much to be desired. The 
chairperson participated in the investigation including ‘simple administrative tasks such as asking for 
extensions of time for comment on the process through her lawyers’.56 It must be noted that the Public 
Protector, just like the IEC is not a court of law but an institution which is designed to enhance the proper 
and effective adherence to the evolution of the principles of the rule of law. Its role is deeply rooted in the 
Constitution and the subsequent Protector’s Act.57 The latter traces its powers to the law and procedure 
that she followed in conducting the investigation. The importance of the Act was endorsed by Nugent J in 
the Mail & Guardian judgment as he held that: 
 the Act repeats in greater detail the constitutional jurisdiction of the Public Protector over public 
bodies and functionaries and it also extends that jurisdiction to include other persons and entities 
in certain circumstances. In broad terms, the Public Protector may investigate, amongst other 
things, any alleged improper or dishonest conduct with respect to public money, any alleged 
offence created by specified sections of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
12 of 2004 with respect to public money, and any alleged improper or unlawful receipt of 
improper advantage by a person as a result of conduct by various public entities or 
functionaries.58  
In a sense, the Act gives a practical expression to the rule law and accountability as it enables the 
Public Protector to enforce the limitation on the abuse of administrative powers including the failure to 
uphold the rules by Chapter 9 institutions.59 As the report affirms, Adv. Tlakula misconstrued the 
mandate and powers of the Public Protector60 as she failed to acknowledge the oath of office in upholding 
the foundational values of transparency, accountability and other related factors in consolidating South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy.61  
Second, Adv. Tlakula could not accept as correct the findings of the Public Protector, creating an 
impression that the PP was lying. She raised procedural issues as she held that the Public Protector failed 
to present her with the investigation strategy. It is quite strange that the findings of the Public Protector 
which were confirmed by other independent bodies could not be accepted as correct because it diminishes 
the important role and integrity of the institution as a ‘defence against bureaucratic oppression and against 
corruption and malfeasance in public office that is capable of insidiously destroying the nation’.62 If there 
was something untoward in respect of the manner in which the Public Protector conducted the 
investigation, she could have allowed for an opportunity for the report to be debated in Parliament before 
giving an opinion. It is the latter that has jurisdiction to deal with the dispute over both procedural and 
substantive issues in relation to the investigation. The matter could then, after being debated in Parliament 
and a solution is not reached, after Adv. Tlakula made an application for such conduct be reviewed by a 
court of law. The Mail & Guardian judgment has already laid a precedent in this regard as the court found 
that the if Public Protector failed to investigate properly the ‘substance of the allegations that were lodged 
with the institution on the payment of money to suppliers, whether payment fell within the authority of 
the person who authorised it, adherence to principles of good corporate governance [are essential]’.63  
Third, without engaging with the procedural issues, Adv. Tlakula could not as well respond to the 
findings of the Public Protector as she was waiting to hear the feedback on the concerns she raised with 
the National Minister of Finance. The non-responsiveness of the chairperson to the findings created a 
negative perception and an impression of the Public Protector who was on a witch hunt to taint the image 
of the IEC. It further undermines the credibility of the Public Protector’s findings which are essential to 
                                               
56 See the Report at 6. 
57 See the Public Protector Act (note 38 above). 
58 At para 10. 
59 See Shivute P ‘The rule of law in sub-Saharan Africa: an overview’ at 213 in Horn N & Bosl A (eds) (note 19 
above). 
60 See the Report at 200. 
61 Mogoeng M ‘Judiciary to do things ‘differently and better’ Mail & Guardian Newspaper, 12 August 2012. 
62 M&G at para 6. 
63 M&G at para 99. 
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the adherence to its recommendations.64 Basically, it compromised her fiduciary duties which are a 
requirement of good governance.65 
Fourth, the IEC itself, even though at first, showed commitment to the office of the Public 
Protector, turned around and shifted the responsibility solely to Adv. Tlakula. In this instance, it also filed 
an affidavit in the UDM judgment and committed itself that it will comply with the decision of the 
Electoral Court and did not take part in the proceedings.66 The matter was further concretised when the 
‘remaining commissioners gave assurance that they and the Commission would not be hampered in the 
performance of their functions, should the respondent not be present or available during the [07 th May 
2014] elections [which were forthcoming at the time]. This issue was, accordingly, not a bar to the 
continuation of these proceedings’.67 
Fifth, notwithstanding its distancing itself from the matter, the current CEO approved the provision 
of legal fees to Adv. Tlakula in fighting the Public Protector’s report. Although it further alleges that the 
CEO approved the funding without the IEC, the latter, as an institution bears an ultimate responsibility as 
an institution that is required to be led by credible people of high moral standing and authority in 
leadership and governance.  
Sixth, the acceptance of the Public Protector’s certain recommendations by the Ad hoc Committee 
of the National Assembly but unable to accede to them as it argued that it will be unconstitutional to do so 
raises uncertainty on the credibility of the parliamentary processes which are directly linked to political 
appointments.68 It further undermines the jurisprudence that emanates from the Constitutional Court as 
the latter pointed out in Glenister that for example, there are jurisdictions like ours where the executive 
has a final responsibility on the functioning of the state institutions and is a special feature of our 
constitutional democracy for the Cabinet to take final responsibility on how the institutions uphold the 
rule of law.69 
Seventh, the whole process is compromised by the non-committal of the President as both the head 
of the national executive and legislature70 in ensuring the decisive adherence to the findings of the Public 
Protector. This creates a division in the ‘promotion of unity of the nation as led by its institutions in 
advancing the interests of the Republic’.71 South Africa, notwithstanding its twenty years into the 
democracy, its consolidation of effective and proper measures is still in its infancy because the tug of war 
between these institutions raises questions which are among others related to the role of the President as 
both the head of state and the head of the national executive in ensuring the protection of the integrity of 
both institutions to ensure not only the country’s developmental aspirations but:  
 Robust and constitutional order in which the rule of law is extended beyond the confines of 
government action to its functionaries. 
 Responsive and accountable functionaries. 
 Implementation of choices that are made in respect of rights and freedoms of the citizens. 
 Responsive leadership to improve investor confidence and reduce corruption.72 
 
This role is further clouded by findings against the President himself of having benefited unduly 
from the upgrade of his Nkandla private residence at a cost of more than R200m.73 Without a focus on the 
latter, these findings are essential for the determination of the striving of South Africa’s democracy 
towards maturity as they reinforce the commitment to the investigation of alleged impropriety in public 
administration and governance. They affirm that irrespective of socio-political status, any allegations of 
misconduct will be investigated but such objective, is undermined by the manner in which the Adv 
Tlakula and the President handled the matter. In this regard, the lack of decisiveness by the President in 
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this matter has provided an opportunity for religious leaders who grouped themselves and came into the 
fold and slandered the Public Protector of poisoning the atmosphere in South Africa.74 Such conduct is 
nothing more than a lack of respect which has decreased public confidence and damaged the reputation of 
the Public Protector75 which has been created by the President. The matter is further compromised by the 
absence of leave which was granted to Adv. Tlakula by the President after the findings of the Electoral 
Court that also recommended for the National Assembly to ‘adopt the facts, views and conclusions of the 
court which found that she committed the misconduct that warranted her removal from office’.76  
Notwithstanding these factors, the Public Protector was vindicated by the Electoral Court in the 
UDM judgment as it held that: 
 the person who occupies the office of commissioner must be free from conduct which can taint 
that high office, irrespective of when the misconduct occurred.77 
 Adv.Tlakula stood in a fiduciary duty towards the Commission and owed it a duty to disclose a 
potential conflict of interest.  
 The skewed procurement process suffered from multiple infringements, which, in turn, favoured 
her business associate to the detriment of other bidders and at a cost substantially to the 
detriment of the Commission by causing it to incur unjustified expenditure.  
 The conduct of [Adv. Tlakula] was inconsistent with her office and obligations as CEO and 
accounting officer; she had breached the norms that govern her office.  
 It was also unlawful in circumstances where she was imbued with the particular responsibility to 
ensure proper legal process.  
 Her wrongdoing shows that she misconducted herself seriously in dealing with the business of 
the Commission.78 
The above factors advance the human factor in the regulation of constitutional duties. They 
compromise the credibility of the two institutions, particularly the IEC, who is assigned to execute the 
responsibility of the office in a manner that promotes the integrity of the institution.79 The lack of 
decisiveness by the National Assembly in the Public Protector, Treasury and the Electoral Court findings 
leaves so much to be desired and questions the credibility of the Assembly and its accountability to the 
general populace of the Republic of South Africa. It actually strengthens the tug of war between the 
institutions that are designed to enhance the proper evolution of the values of the principles of the new 
democratic dispensation. 
3. Conclusion 
The bone of contention in this article is not to examine the powers and independence of these institutions 
but rather to identify factors that compromise their integrity in response to the Public Protector’s findings. 
The Public Protector has since her appointment, uncovered most of the hidden corrupt activities by high 
profile people. It has been identified that there are various factors as indicated above which have the 
potential to compromise the integrity of these institutions. If the findings and recommendations of the 
Public Protector are not properly handled and the National Assembly does not thread carefully in 
responding to the reports of these institutions, it will slowly destroy the gains that South Africa has 
achieved. 
     
 
  © 2015 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-
No Derivative Works.  
Cite as:  Ntlama, N., The Brewing tug-of war between South Africa’s Chapter 9 Institutions: The public 
Protector vs the Independent Electoral Commission. Journal of International Commercial Law and 
Technology, Vol.10  No.1  (May, 2015) 
                                               
74 See report by Ispas M ‘Bishops accuses Public Protector of poisoning the atmosphere in South Africa’ City Press 
Newspaper, dated 13 March 2014. 
75 See Marumoagae (note 47 above). 
76 UDM at para 161. 
77 UDM at para 44. 
78 UDM at para 151. 
79 Diescho, (note 19 above). 
